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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHEL LOUNSBURY, ) 
) REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case comes before the Court from a -judgment entered 
after both parties made a proffer of evidence before the lower 
court judge. All of the facts stated in the Defendant's Brief 
were not established by this proffered evidence. Since no jury 
involvement took place, the judgment should be characterized as a 
directed verdict. For this reason Plaintiff urges the Court to 
disregard the facts as stated in the Defendant's Brief and note 
that because it is reviewing a directed verdict, Plaintiff's 
version of the facts is the only one that it should consider. 
The standard of review is that this court must examine the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff against whom 
the directed verdict was entered. Ferris v. Chugach Electric 
Assn., 557 P.2d 763 (Alaska 1976); Penney v. St. Marks Hospital, 
442 P.2d 944 (Utah 1968); Wells v. Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Co. , 426 P.2d 229 (Utah 1967). And, if there is a 
reasonable basis in the evidence, and in the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff in this case, the final order of the lower court must 
be reversed. Management Committee of Greystone Pines Home Owners 
Assn. v. Greystone Pines Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Because the Plaintiff never provided consent for 
the surgery he received, Defendant's focus on "informed consent" 
case authority is misplaced. Without any consent, the cause of 
action arises outside the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
provisions. 
POINT II; When substitute consent was obtained from 
Plaintiff's wife, despite Plaintiff's being competent to provide 
such consent himself, the substitute consent was invalid and 
outside statutory sanctions. 
POINT III: When Defendant was permitted to rely upon 
substitute consent that was more cooperative and convenient, 
instead of Plaintiff's competent and withheld consent, Plaintiff 
was deprived of basic protective liberty over himself. If such 
alternative consent is permitted under the circumstances, then 
Section 78-14-5(3) of the Utah Code is without meaning and 
Section 78-14-5(4)(b) is unconstitutional. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN ANY CONSENT 
WHATSOEVER FROM PLAINTIFF WAS A BATTERY, NOT 
A FAILURE TO OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT 
The Plaintiff voluntarily submitted to diagnosis and testing 
prior to surgery. He withheld and/or refused his consent to the 
surgery and anesthesia repeatedly while simultaneously asking for 
a conference with Defendant. 
Plaintiff never consented to the surgery. Surgery without 
consent ijs a battery. Riedisser v. Nelson, 11 Ariz ^47, S14 
P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 
P.2d 852, 860, aff'd 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1974); Cluff, 
California Supreme Court Expands The Informed Consent Doctrine; 
Physicians Have A Duty To Obtain An Informed Refusal: Truman v. 
Thomas, 1980 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 933, 933 n.2. Wheie the entire course 
of surgery on Plaintiff was performed without consent, all 
incisions, medication, etc., are tortious injuries. 
Defendant urges that the claim the Plaintiff filed is an 
"informed consent" type malpractice claim. This is not correct. 
Informed consent is the name for a general principal of law that 
a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent 
physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable 
care would disclose to his patient as to risk so that the patient 
can balance risk and benefit before electing surgery. Zebarth v. 
Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 
(1972) . Informed consent issues turn on partial disclosure of a 
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collateral hazard to the patient before consent is obtained. 
Nishi v, Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 296, 473 P.2d 116, 118 (1970). 
Disclosure in each case is variable dependent upon circumstances. 
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 224, 502 P.2d 1 (1972). 
In this case consent was never provided. Plaintiff has not 
alleged partial disclosure. He has alleged that no consent 
whatsoever was given. The issue arises at the basic consent 
level itself, not at whether Defendant made appropriate 
disclosures when obtaining consent. There was never an express 
or implied consent to the Plaintiff's surgery by the Plaintiff 
himself. 
The Plaintiff did not acquiesce to the surgery. He 
specifically, intentionally and repeatedly withheld his consent 
from the anesthesiologist and Defendant physician. He instead 
requested a conference with the Defendant which he never received 
while at the hospital prior to surgery. Therefore, he has 
properly made out a prima facie case for battery and whether he 
obtained proper disclosures to establish informed consent is 
irrelevant to this case. 
POINT II 
THE SUBSTITUTE CONSENT BY PLAINTIFF'S WIFE 
WAS INVALID BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS NEITHER A 
MINOR, NOR INCAPACITATED, NOR WAS AN 
EMERGENCY CONDITION PRESENT 
Plaintiff attacks the validity of consent for surgery 
obtained from a third party. In Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 2 21, 
377 P.2d 520, 524 (New Mexico 1962) the court states that without 
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the disclosure by the doctor [addressing the issue of "informed 
consent"] it is said that the patient is not informed and that, 
therefore, "any consent obtained is ineffectual." Id., 377 P.2d 
at 524. "An adult person, if he be of sound mind, is considered 
to have the right to determine for himself whether a recommended 
treatment or surgery shall be performed upon him . . . ." 
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 398, 350 P.2d 1093 (1966). 
The right of one to give his own competent consent is 
specifically protected by Section 78-14-5(3). Plaintiff asserts 
that it is also his right to have a jury determine the 
circumstances of his competency to consent or not. 
A fair reading of Section 78-14-5(3) establishes the 
uncompromised right of a patient to refuse treatment including 
surgery. To hold, as did the court below, that despite this 
protected right the substitute consent obtained after heavily 
medicating Plaintiff is somehow more valid or superseding in 
nature than the Plaintiff's express withholding of consent, is 
clearly erroneous. Since the law presumes sanity or competence, 
Grannum v. Berard, 422 P.2d 812 (Wash. 1967) , the determination 
of valid consent should rest with the trier of fact. In this 
case, a jury was not allowed to consider the issue and it should 
be remanded for determination by the trier of fact. 
"Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent 
any person 18 years of age or over from refusing to consent to 
health care for his own person upon personal or religious 
grounds." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(3) (1987). 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE 
VIOLATED WHEN DEFENDANT WAS PERMITTED TO RELY 
ON SUBSTITUTE CONSENT AFTER AFFIRMATIVE 
REFUSAL OF SUCH CONSENT 
Absent some compelling reason such as incapacity, minor 
child, or emergency, consent for medical treatment is reserved to 
the individual himself. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P. 2d 93 (Utah 
1982); Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(3) (1987). Permitting anyone to 
override the competent withholding of consent to medical 
treatment offends notions of basic personal liberties afforded 
constitutional protection. Certainly, the drafters of the Utah 
malpractice statute intended no such offense. 
The recent Supreme Court case of Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, (1990) is 
helpful in identifying and reaffirming some important 
constitutionally protected interests applicable in our case. 
In Cruzan, the Court was faced with allowing a family to 
substitute their judgment for that of a patient when the patient 
was in a persistent vegetative state. Withdrawal of medical 
treatment would bring certain death to the patient. It is within 
this context the Court discusses substitute judgment issues. 
The Court sustained the finding of the Missouri Supreme 
Court which had held that because there was no clear and 
convincing evidence of the patient's desire to have 
life-sustaining treatment withdrawn under the circumstances, her 
parents lacked authority to effectuate such a request. The Court 
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sustained this finding despite personal testimony of a roommate 
to the contrary. 
In this case there was affirmative conduct in withholding 
consent for treatment during uncontested periods of competence by 
the patient himself. Clearly, the Court would not validate 
contrary substitute consent. 
Utah's statutes do preserve the right of an individual to 
withhold his or her consent from any medical treatment. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-5 (3) (1987) . It does not permit substitute 
judgment on this issue if contrary to a competent determination 
by the patient himself. 
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court states that the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of 
lifef liberty, or property without due process of law." The 
principal that a competent person has a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in unwanted medical treatment may be 
inferred from our previous decisions." Cruzan, 111 L. Ed.2d 224, 
241. The Court was unable to justify permitting the parents to 
withhold medical treatment from their daughter because there was 
insufficient evidence of their daughter's wishes. 
Cruzan is not wholly unlike this case. Here, Plaintiff 
expressed repeatedly his refusal to sign consent forms for either 
the surgery or the anesthesia. Yet once he was made 
incapacitated by medication, the Defendant secured consent by the 
substitute judgment of the Plaintiff's spouse, obviously contrary 
to Plaintiff's express wishes. Plaintiff's constitutional right 
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to determine his medical treatment was violated. The Defendant's 
actions also breached the statutory protection outlined in 
Section 78-14-5(3). 
The Court cautioned against the very facts presented in our 
case when it further warned "there is no automatic insurance that 
the view of close family members will necessarily be the same as 
the patient's would have been had she been confronted with the 
prospect of her situation while competent." Cruzan, 111 L. Ed.2d 
224, 247. The substitute judgment may be further clouded when, 
as here, the spouse was startled by being summoned to the 
hospital early in the morning, then pressured to sign the consent 
forms. That consent was directly opposed to the intentional 
actions of the patient while competent. It was not valid 
consent. 
The Cruzan case supports and gives great affirmation to the 
principle behind Section 78-14-5(3) which expressly reserves the 
liberty of consent to treatment to the patient and should be 
applied by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Defendant failed to obtain the necessary consent 
from the Plaintiff prior to performing surgery, and because the 
Plaintiff was competent to and did withhold consent prior to 
surgery, the acts of the Defendant constitute battery, not 
failure to obtain informed consent, upon the Plaintiff. 
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Further, despite consent being provided by Plaintiff's 
spouse, such consent was ineffective because either the Defendant 
negligently or intentionally created circumstances of temporary 
incapacity so as to justify substitute consent. The Defendant 
should not be permitted to take refuge behind the malpractice 
statutes when the case is proceding properly as a battery cause 
of action. 
Finally, if the Utah statute is applied in such a way as to 
negate the Plaintiff's own refusal to provide the Defendant with 
consent and the substitute consent of his spouse is validated 
under the circumstances of this case, it is unconstitutional. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
decision of the lower court and remand the case for trial on the 
merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ day of November, 1990. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
IJJ/T^ 
At tornfeye—to^Plaintiff/Appellant 
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